Flight in General: Its Effect on Procedural Rights, Constitutional Law, and the Grand Jury by Parker, Gerald Corbett
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 34 | Number 3 Article 13
4-1-1956
Flight in General: Its Effect on Procedural Rights,
Constitutional Law, and the Grand Jury
Gerald Corbett Parker
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gerald C. Parker, Flight in General: Its Effect on Procedural Rights, Constitutional Law, and the Grand Jury, 34 N.C. L. Rev. 367 (1956).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol34/iss3/13
NOTES AND COMMENTS
business deal; an act involving buying and selling; as the transactions
on the exchange. Its synonym is negotiation.' (Webster's New Inten-
national Dictionary, Second Edition). ' '3°
It would seem that the reasoning used by the North Carolina Court
in the principal case, in view of the normally accepted understanding of
the wording used in the "dead man's statute," is not in keeping with the
better reasoned interpretation of the statute. However, the holding of
the Court is a good one in view of the modern trend toward the admissi-
bility of evidence. It would seem that this holding is in keeping with the
normally accepted understanding of the wording of the statute and that
the holdings in the previously cited automobile cases distorted the intent
of the statute.
DONALD LEON MOORE.
Flight in General: Its Effect on Procedural Rights, Constitutional
Law, and the Grand jury
The Louisiana code provides that a challenge to the array of a grand
jury must be made "before the expiration of the third judicial day of
the term for which said grand jury shall have been drawn, or before
entering upon the trial of the case if it be sooner. . . ."' In the recent
case of Poret v. LouisianaP this statute was involved. There, one of
the defendants, Poret, fled the state after the consummation of the
offense and remained outside the jurisdiction until one and one half
years after the termination of the term of the grand jury which indicted
him. At arraignment on October 27, 1952, assisted by his own counsel,
he pleaded not guilty and was granted additional time to file a motion
for severance. On November 7, 1952, after denial of his motion for
severance, he moved-for the first time-to quash the indictment be-
cause of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury. The
trial court denied the motion, after finding that defendant was a fugitive
from justice, on the ground that it was filed more than a year and a half
too late. The Supreme Courts of Louisiana 3 and of the United States
4
affirmed, the latter on three grounds. First, the court considered the
defendant as having forfeited his right to challenge by his own action in
voluntarily fleeing. Second, even after having returned to the state he
"' Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 753, 102 S. W. 552, 553 (1937).
'Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 92 (1955). The phrase "third judicial
day of the term" has been interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court to mean
"the third judicial day following the term." State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 14 So.
2d 873 (1943).
350 U. S. 91 (1955).
Poret v. State, 225 La. 1040, 74 So. 2d 207 (1954).
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91 (1955).
Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36 (1896).
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did not object at the first opportunity.5 Third, under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state may attach reasonable
time limitations to the assertion of federal constitutional rights. The
majority, through Justice Clark, stated:
"We do not believe that the mere fugitive status existing here
excuses a failure to resort to Louisiana's established statutory
procedure available to all who wish to assert claimed consti-
tutional rights. This is not to say that the act of fleeing and be-
coming a fugitive deprives one of federal rights. We hold only
that due regard for the fair as well as effective administration of
criminal justice gives the State a legitimate interest in requiring
reasonable attacks on its inquisitorial process and that the present
case is not one in which this interest must bow to essential con-
siderations of fairness to individual defendants." [Emphasis
added.]
Justice Black, dissenting, with whom Justice Douglas and the Chief
justice concurred, declared:
"Under our system even a bad man is entitled to have his case
considered at every stage by a fair tribunal. ' 7
Justice Douglas, dissenting, with whom Justice Black and the Chief
Justice concurred, stated:
"But it is dangerous doctrine to deprive a man of his consti-
tutional rights in one case for his wrongful conduct in another.
That is a doctrine that currently is gaining momentum. . . . I
would give every accused, regardless of his record ...the full
benefit of the constitutional guarantees of due process."
A similar case is Daniels v. Allen,9 considered along with a group
of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court under the title of
Brown v. Allen.10 Petitioners objected to the systematic exclusion of
Negroes from the grand jury at trial. The trial court granted them 60
days in which to appeal. On the 60th day counsel called the prosecuting
attorney's office to serve him, but he was out of town for the weekend.
Thus service was made on Monday, the 61st day, after the prosecuting
attorney had returned to his office. The state supreme court granted
the prosecuting attorney's motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
6 Poret v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 98 (1955).
'Id. at 104.
'Id. at 105-06.
344 U. S. 443, 484 (1952). For the North Carolina Supreme Court's treatment
of this case prior to the appeal to the United States Supreme Court see State v.
Daniels, 231 N. C. 17, 56 S. E. 2d 2 (1949).
10344 U. S. 443, 484 (1952). See Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 185 (1946) and
N. C. GEx. STAT. § 9-1 (1953).
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that the notice was one day late, and the court refused to consider the
appeal on its merits. The United States Supreme Court affirmed on
the ground that the state furnished an adequate and easily complied-with
method of appeal, and that habeas corpus should not be a substitute for
appeal. Justice Black, dissenting, stated:
"Although admittedly the [North Carolina] court had discre-
tionary authority to hear the appeal, it dismissed the case. Pe-
titioners were thereby prevented from arguing the point of racial
discrimination and consequently it has never been passed on by
an appellate court. This denial of state appellate review plus the
obvious racial discrimination thus left uncorrected should be
enough to make one of those 'extraordinary situations' which the
Court says authorizes federal courts to protect the constitutional
rights of state prisoners."'"
The United States Supreme Court indicated in Frisbie v. Collins'2
that "special circumstances" may justify federal entry in a case where
prompt federal intervention is required. Obviously, the Supreme Court
did not think that "special circumstances" were present in the Poret
and Brown cases, although in both cases systematic exclusion of Negroes
from the grand jury was apparent. Also, several defendants were facing
execution.
Justice Black, dissenting, in the Brown case declared:
"The court thinks that to review this question and grant peti-
tioners the protections guaranteed by the Constitution would
'subvert the entire system of state criminal justice and destroy
state energy in the detection and punishment of crime.' I cannot
agree. State systems are not so feeble."'18
Thus it seems that a dominant consideration of the majority in both
cases is the idea of maintaining a balance between state and federal
power. Also, the majority, for a test, looked only at the reasonableness
of the state regulation, and not at the way the regulation affected the
respective petitioners.'4
Illustrative of the ability of the court to reach an opposite con-
clusion with the "reasonableness test" is Reece v. Georgia,15 decided
2' Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 553 (1952).
12342 U. S. 519, 521 (1951).
18 Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 553 (1952).
"Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 93 (1955): 'We do not find that this
requirement on its face raises an insuperable barrier to one making claim to
federal rights. The test is whether the defendant had 'reasonable opportunity
to have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined' by the State
Court." See alsa Paterno v. Lyons, 334 U. S. 314 (1947) and Parker v. Illinois,
333 U. S. 571 (1948).
18350 U. S. 85 (1955).
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the same day as the Poret case. There the state regulation provided
that challenge to the composition of the grand jury must be made
before indictment. The defendant was arrested three days before,
and attorneys were not appointed to defend him until one day after, his
indictment. Five days after appointment counsel moved to quash the
indictment on the ground that Negroes had been systematically excluded
from the grand jury. The motion was overruled, and the state supreme
court affirmed.16 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
the regulation unconstitutional, saying through Justice Clark:
"But it is utterly unrealistic to say that he had such opportunity
when counsel was not provided for him until the day after he was
indicted .... Georgia should have considered Reece's motion to
quash on its merits."17
Compare that statement with the statement of Justice Douglas in his
dissent in the Poret case:
"The opportunity to raise the constitutional objection, therefore,
was foreclosed before he was arraigned and, as far as the record
shows, before he had any knowledge that the indictment was
pending against him. It is as if the grand jury had been im-
paneled before the commission of the offense, and the time for
raising objections to it expired with the impaneling, as was the
case of Carter v. State of Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 20 S. Ct. 687, 689,
55 L. Ed. 839. Under these circumstances Poret had no real
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the composition
of the grand jury."' 8
Justice Clark in the Reece case cited and relied upon the Carter case
as authority, saying:
"In the present case as in Carter, the right to object to a grand
jury presupposes an opportunity to exercise that right."'u
It should be noted that both the majority and minority in the Poret case
relied on many of the same cases, and Justice Clark in the Reece case
relied on some of the same cases as the minority in the Poret case. One
great difficulty in ascertaining what the law is on this subject is made
manifest by the fact that the same cases can be relied on as authority for
opposite conclusions.
In the Reece case nothing was said about counsel's failure to raise
the federal question at the first opportunity. It should be emphasized
" Reece v. State, 211 Ga. 339, 85 S. E. 2d 773 (1955).7 Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 89 (1955).
" Poret v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 105 (1955).
"Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 89 (1955).
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that counsel did not raise the point until five days after appointment,
the exact number of days that the court held too late, as not made at
the first opporunity, in Agnew v. United States.20 The court neverthe-
less thought that the federal right should be protected, so the state
regulation was declared unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional. In
Michel v. Louisiana ,21 considered along with the Poret case, there was
a misunderstanding between the trial court and counsel as to exactly
when counsel was appointed, whether when the trial court orally
appointed counsel in open court or when he received formal notice of
appointment some three days later. The trial court considered him ap-
pointed as of the time of the oral appointment, and a motion to quash
the indictment because of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the
grand jury was denied because it was four days too late, it being made
seven days after oral appointment and four days after formal appoint-
ment. Despite the misunderstanding, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed, accepting the trial court's theory that counsel was appointed as
of the time of oral appointment in open court and stating that a motion
to quash is a short, simple document, easily prepared in a single after-
noon. It is true that a motion to quash could easily be prepared in a
single afternoon, but to investigate and collect evidence concerning
systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury, so as to warrant
preparation of such a motion, might take a considerable amount of time.
No matter at which time one considers counsel to have been appointed in
the Michel case, the motion was made not later than two days after the
motion in the Reece case. If one takes the view that counsel was not
empowered to act until his formal appointment, the motion was made
one day sooner than the motion in the Reece case.
The distinction does not seem clear. Apparently, the court thought
that the Louisiana regulation did not raise "an insuperable barrier to
one making claim to federal rights,122 whereas it thought that the regu-
lation in the Reece case did. Counsel in the Poret case did not file his
motion to quash until twelve days after he was employed by Poret, and
the court held this too late, either with or without regard to the Louisi-
ana statute.
Aside from the position taken by the majority in the Poret case that
the Louisiana statute was objectively reasonable; the decision seems to
be based upon the voluntary flight of Poret. What, then, are the rights
generally of one who evades the law by fleeing?
Generally, the law is rather harsh to persons who evade it, as is
illustrated by the Poret case. A fleeing felon in North Carolina may
be declared an outlaw, and any person can arrest him, or slay him if
20165 U. S. 36 (1896). 21350 U. S. 91 (1955).
-- See note 14 supra.
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necessary.23 If he flees the state he may lose his state citizenship and
his right to personal property exemptions.24  If before trial, he simply
flees, within or without the state, he loses his right to a speedy trial ;25
he may be denied a continuance for the purpose of obtaining witnesses,
the rationale being that he did not use proper diligence ;26 and the statute
of limitations is suspended.27 If defendant flees after trial his appeal
will be dismissed or his case left off the docket,28 unless he is in actual29
or constructive3 0 custody at the time of the consideration of the appeal.
It would seem that an austere stand may be justified where the defendant
has already been tried and found guilty and then flees. But it seems that
the court is not justified in saying that he has lost some substantial right
where he flees prior to trial. As was pointed out in Hickory v. United
States:
"A person however conscious of innocence might not have
courage to stand trial, but might, although innocent, think it
necessary to consult his safety by flight."3'
Where the defendant has fled, upon being tried he may find that
22 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-48 (1953). See State v. Stancill, 128 N. C. 606, 611-12,
38 S. E. 926, 928 (1901) for vindicative language by Justice Cook: "So care-
ful is the law to protect those who have not been tried and convicted that the
'outlaws' are entitled to be 'called upon and warned to surrender' before they are
allowed to be slain."
2" Cromer y. Self, 149 N. C. 164, 62 S. E. 885 (1908). See N. C. GEN. STAT.§§ 15-55 to -84 (1953) and Notes, 10 N. C. L. Rzv. 292 (1931), 11 N. C. L. Rlv.
163 (1932), 15 N. C. L. REv. 343, 344 (1936), 41 HARV. L. REv. 74 (1927) and
31 MINx. L. Rav. 699 (1047) on extradition.
2 Chelf v. State, 223 Ind. 70, 58 N. E. 2d 353 (1945); McGuire v. Wallace,
109 Ind. 284, 10 N. E. 111 (1887).
"' Hubbard v. State, 65 Neb. 805, 91 N. W. 869 (1902) ; see Stevens v. State,
49 S. W. 105 (Tex. Cr. App. 1899) where a continuance for the co-defendant of
the fugitive was not granted because it was doubtful if the attendance of the
fugitive could be procured.
"' State v. Miller, 188 Mo. 370, 87 S. W. 484 (1905) ; In re Bruce, 132 Fed. 390(C. C. Md. 1904) (1904), aff'd in Bruce v. Bryan, 136 Fed. 1022 (C. C. Md.1905) ; State v. Pelley, 221 N. C. 487, 20 S. E. 2d 860 (1942) ; Streep v. United
States, 160 U. S. 128 (1895).
28 Eisler v. United States, 338 U. S. 189 (1949) ; Wood v. State, 61 S. W. 308(Tex. Cr. App. 1901) ; Harris v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 429, 224 S. W. 2d 427(1950) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543 (1867) held, that the fugi-
tive loses his right to be heard by counsel on appeal where he flees after trial.
29 Knight v. State, 190 Tenn. 326, 229 S. W. 2d 501 (1950). But see Savage v.
State, 174 P. 2d 272 (Okla. Cr. Rep. 1947) which held, that it is within the dis-
cretion of the Appellate Court to review where the prisoner voluntarily left the
state, and Bland v. State, 224 S. W. 2d 479 (Tex. Cr. App. 1950) which held,
that the appeal would be dismissed unless the prisoner could show good cause why
it should be reinstated even where the prisoner was then in actual custody.
The rationale of the rule seems to be that the court will not consider an appeal
of the defendant unless he can be made to respond to any judgment or order the
court may enter in the case. Kuyendall v. State, 168 P. 2d 142 (Okla. Cr. App.
1946). In State v. Cody, 119 N. C. 908. 26 S. E. 252, 56 Am. St. Rep. 692(1896) the convict had escaoed and had been at large for two years, and still
was at the time of the consideration of the appeal.
20 Peoole v. Cossey. 217 P. 2d 133 (Cal. Alpp. 1950).
21 160 U. S. 408, 418 (1895). This case has an excellent discussion on flight.
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his flight has created certain natural and non-legal presumptions against
him.32  Flight is usually easy to establish, and it is almost universally
present in crimes of violence. Flight in any direction,3 3 and for any
amount of time or any distance3 4 will warrant an instruction by the court
as to flight. Though flight alone is not sufficient to establish guilt,3 5 it is
a legitimate ground for the inference of guilt ;36 add to this his departure
immediately after the consummation of the offense, and his traveling
under aliases to avoid detection, and such is in itself evidence of guilt.37
As a matter of course, it is for the jury to determine the weight that is
to be given the evidence. 38 Where the state makes no contention that
defendant fled he cannot introduce evidence of voluntary surrender. 9
Although the offense be admitted,40 or the defendant voluntarily sur-
rendered,41 evidence of flight may nevertheless be admitted. Thus, it
seems that the state can always take advantage of flight, but that the
defendant cannot take advantage of voluntary surrender or a refusal to
flee 42 unless the state first enters evidence of flight, or the defendant vol-
untarily surrenders prior to an indictment being filed against him.43
Once evidence of flight is offered by the state, the defendant has the
right to explain away the flight by using any evidence consistent with
his innocence.44 Evidence of a willingness to surrender voluntarily45 is
admissible where a flight instruction is given, and, in such a caserthe
" "He who flees from trial confesses his guilt." PUBLILI SYRI, SENTENTIAE
30 (1870). "The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the righteous are bold
as a lion." Paovaaas 28:1.
" People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal. App. 2d 231, 95 P. 2d 169 (1939). Defendant's
flight was from the presence of threatening police and not from the premises which
he was charged with looting.
" Hamby v. State, 71 Ga. App. 817, 32 S. E. 2d 546 (1945). After the shoot-
ing the defendant ran and was apprehended at home an hour later, not having fled
the community. Muse v. State, 29 Ala. App. 271, 196 So. 148, cert. denied 239
Ala. 557, 196 So. 151 (1940). Defendant "whirled and run" after taking the pocket
book and was apprehended the next day, not having left the city.
"Howard v. State, 182 Miss. 27, 181 So. 525 (1938).
" United States v. Heitner, 149 F. 2d 105, cert. denied 326 U. S. 727, rehearing
denied 326 U. S. 809 (1945) ; Bird v. United States, 187 U. S. 118 (1902) ; Allen
v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896).
"' People v. Peak, 66 Cal. App. 2d 894, 153 P. 2d 464 (1944) ; People v. Waller,
14 Cal. 2d 693, 96 P. 2d 344 (1939).
"State v. Torphy, 217 Ind. 383, 28 N. E. 2d 70 (1940).
Moyers v. State, 61 Ga. App. 324, 6 S. E. 2d 438 (1940) ; Starke v. State,31 Ala. App. 322, 16 So. 2d 426 (1944); Slappey v. State, 64 Ga. App. 713, 13
S. E. 2d 873 (1941).
"State v. Hargraves, 62 Idaho 8, 107 P. 2d 854 (1941).
,x People v. Reese, 65 Cal. App. 2d 329, 150 P. 2d 571 (1944).
"Moyers v. State, 61 Ga. App. 324, 6 S. E. 2d 438 (1940).
,People v. Martin, 380 Ill. 328, 44 N. R. 2d 49 (1942).
"Cavney v. State, 210 Ind. 455, 4 N. E. 2d 137 (1936) ; McAllister v. State,
30 Ala. App. 366, 6 So. 2d 32 (1942).
"'People v. Zammora, 66 Cal. App. 2d 166, 152 P. 2d 819 (1942) ; Compton v.
State, 74 Okla. Cr. Rep. 48, 122 P. 2d 819 (1942); cf. Moyers v. State, 61 Ga.
App. 324, 6 S. E. 2d 438 (1940), which held, that it was not error to exclude
evidence that defendant did not flee after the robbery.
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court should instruct the jury as to the defendant's right to explain
his flight or absence. 46 If voluntary surrender is made before an indict-
ment is filed against the defendant, this overcomes any presumption of
guilt arising from the flight.47
Because there is usually movement by the offender away from the
scene of the crime, it seems that the state could introduce evidence of
flight in most cases, from which the jury could, and it seems invariably
would, draw an inference of guilt. To overcome this inference, the
defendant must come forward with an explanation or suffer the risk of
"non-persuasion." A maxim of the law is that a person is presumed
innocent until proved guilty. For practical purposes, this maxim is
rendered nugatory when evidence is admitted that the defendant "sud-
denly left town," for this places upon him the heavy burden of explana-
tion.
The Poret case is another decision which treated the fleeing felon
with harshness, but unlike the state and federal cases just referred to,
it considered the defendant's flight in conjunction with a denial of federal
constitutional rights in a state criminal prosecution. Though there may
be strong reasons for an unsympathetic attitude toward the fleeing felon,
this does not justify being extremely technical or vindictive when there
are serious showings that he was denied some substantial or constitu-
tional right at his day in court. Justice Black asked: "Could a state
statute of limitations like this one declare that anyone under indictment
who flees the State has thereby waived his right to counsel or his right
to be tried by an unbiased judge ?,,48 Unquestionably, we would all re-
spond negatively. The great danger lies in the affirmative answer of this
next question posed by Justice Black: "If Poret can be denied this
constitutional right, why not others ?'49 Involved here are not only the
rights of the fugitive from justice, but also those of all men accused of
crime. The court should not seek to punish a defendant who is guilty of
having fled either before or after trial by denying him a hearing on a
constitutional question.50 It is submitted that the minority opinion in
the Poret case is the preferable view.
GERALD CORBETT PARKER.
"Compton v. State, 74 Okla. Cr. Rep. 48, 122 P. 2d 819 (1942) ; McAllister
v. State, 30 Ala. App. 366, 6 So. 2d 32 (1942).
" People v. Martin, 380 Ill. 328, 44 N. E. 2d 49 (1942). This decision may be
explained by the fact that the defendant was highly nervous and that the prose-
cutrix was only six years of age.
"' Poret v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 103 (1955) ; cf. It re Murchison, 349 U. S.
133 (1955).
"Poret v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 103 (1955).
t0 Id. at 103: "Poret could have been charged with a federal crime under 62
STAT. 755, 18 U. S. C. § 1073, 18 U. S. C. A. § 1073, for fleeing from one State
to another to avoid prosecution. But he could not have been convicted until after
adequate notice and a fair trial on an indictment returned by a fair grand jury
selected without regard to race or color."
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